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Abstract
The main purpose of this study is to develop a methodology for a multidisciplinary
nuclear risk and vulnerability assessment, and to test this methodology through esti-
mation of a nuclear risk to population in the Northern European countries in case of a
severe accident at the nuclear risk sites. For assessment of the probabilistic risk and5
vulnerability, a combination of social-geophysical factors and probabilities are consid-
ered.
The main focus of this paper is the description of methodology for evaluation of the
atmospheric transport of radioactive releases from the risk site regions. The suggested
methodology is given from the probabilistic point of view. The main questions stated10
are: What are probabilities and times for radionuclide atmospheric transport to different
neighbouring countries and territories in case of the hypothetical accidental release at
the nuclear risk site? Which geographical territories or countries are at the highest risk
from the hypothetical accidental releases?
To answer this question we suggest applying the following research tools for prob-15
abilistic atmospheric studies. First, it is atmospheric modelling to calculate multiyear
forward trajectories originated over the sites. Second, it is statistical analysis tools to
explore temporal and spatial structure of calculated trajectories in order to evaluate
different probabilistic impact indicators: atmospheric transport pathways, airflow, fast
transport, typical transport time, maximum possible impact zone, maximum reaching20
distance, etc. These indicators are applicable for further GIS-analysis and integration
to estimate regional risk and vulnerability in case of accidental releases at the risk sites
and for planning the emergency response and preparedness systems.
1. Introduction
The risks for airborne radioactive contamination and significant radiological conse-25
quences connected with sources in this or adjacent area, in some cases predominantly
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affect the conditions at local and regional levels, yet in others appear to be far reaching,
and of considerable concern for the whole region of concern. Thus, it is of particular
interest to expound on issues such as:
– Which sources appear to be the main concern for those living close to and far from
these sources?5
Which territories or countries are at the highest risk from the hypothetical acci-
dental releases from nuclear risk sites?
For estimation of the potential nuclear risk and vulnerability levels, and for regional
planning of radiological environmental monitoring networks and emergency prepared-10
ness systems, it is very important to determine for the nuclear risk sites (NRSs) of
concern:
– geographical regions, territories, and/or countries most likely to be impacted;
– probabilities and times for various characteristics of atmospheric transport to ge-
ographical regions (including removal or precipitation factor) and their temporal and15
spatial variability;
– worst-case meteorological and accidental scenarios for detailed case studies;
– possible contamination and effects on population in case of an accident;
– site-sensitive hazards of potential airborne radioactive release;
– vulnerability to a radioactive deposition concerning its persistence in the regional20
ecosystems:
– regional risks, socio-economical, and geographical consequences for different geo-
graphical areas and population groups.
Previously, several studies discussed possible approaches, and preliminarily investi-
gated some of the mentioned important issues (e.g. see overview Baklanov, 2002). To25
study the possible consequences and risks from NRSs there could be two approaches
– the case studies assessment (CSA) and the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA).
The CSA is commonly used for estimation of possible doses for population. This ap-
proach is very useful to estimate possible consequences for typical or worst-case ac-
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cidental scenarios and weather situations. However, it is computationally expensive
for long-term (multiyear) simulation and further probabilistic assessments. Moreover, it
is inconvenient for an analysis of factors of different nature (for example, geophysical
processes of radionuclide transport and social-economical factors).
So, alongside with the first approach, for PRA some authors used simple dispersion5
models (mostly on a local scale). For example, the first map of risk due to severe acci-
dents for majority of the European nuclear power plants (NPPs) showed the probability
of excess cancer deaths (Slaper et al., 1994). The shortcoming of this approach was a
limitation by a short distance, because the radioactive plume dispersion was evaluated
by a simple Gaussian model using meteorological data only from one station. Andreev10
et al. (1998) simulated dispersion and deposition with a Lagrangian particle model and
calculated the frequency of exceedance of certain thresholds for 137Cs (regarded as a
risk indicator). Additionally, GIS-based export/import matrices of risk were calculated
for the European countries. Shortcoming of this method is the use of a limited number
of meteorological situations, which can not satisfactory represent a long-term statistics.15
Therefore, for PRA on a regional level some authors suggested to use more econom-
ical trajectory modelling approach. For example, Mahura et al. (1999) and Baklanov et
al. (2002b) used an isentropic trajectory model and cluster analysis technique to as-
sess possible impacts of the hypothetical nuclear accidents in the northern regions. In
particular, the long-term consequences for the Nordic countries population were esti-20
mated on a basis of the Chernobyl accident exposures in Scandinavia (Moberg, 1991;
Dahlgaard, 1994). Mapping of the regional nuclear risk and vulnerability was realized
for Scandinavia based on integration of mathematical modelling and GIS-analysis (Rig-
ina and Baklanov, 2002). Saltbonis et al. (2000) also performed the long-term trajectory
modelling and evaluated a few case studies of the long-range transport from the Kola25
NPP. However, they used 2-D trajectories, and risk mapping was not realized.
The studies of possible regional risk from the North-West Russian NRSs were ini-
tiated in 1991 in bounds of the “Risk” Project of the Russian State Programme “Eco-
logical Safety of Russia” and projects in cooperation with the Kola NPP (Baklanov et
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al., 1992, 1994). These studies were continued during 1995-1997, and extended for
NRSs of the Barents region in a series of international pilot studies/projects where the
dispersion modelling, system analysis, and ranging of possible risk from different sites
were employed (IIASA, 1996; Bergman and Baklanov, 1998; Bergman et al., 1998).
During 1996-1997, other study was performed for the Bilibino NPP using trajectory5
modelling and cluster analysis to evaluate atmospheric transport pathways from NPP
to the State of Alaska (Jaffe et al., 1997a; Mahura, 1998). During 1997–1998, a similar
study which included more detailed probabilistic and several specific cases analyses,
was realized for the Kola NPP (Jaffe et al., 1997b; Baklanov et al., 2001). During
1998-2000, for multidisciplinary analysis of nuclear risk in the Barents region the “Risk10
and Nuclear Waste” Programme was initiated (Baklanov and Bergman, 1999; O¨CB,
2000; Baklanov et al., 2001; Mahura et al., 2001). At the same period, the INTAS
Project supplemented the O¨CB Project (Bergman, 1999; INTAS, 2000). Moreover, a
joint study of the DMI and Novosibirsk Computing Centre of Russia suggested an alter-
native method for estimation of nuclear risk and vulnerability, based on the sensitivity15
theory and inverse modelling (Penenko and Baklanov, 2001).
So, it still remains an important issue to develop a methodology for the multidisci-
plinary nuclear risk and vulnerability assessments. Therefore, the on-going project of
the Nordic countries “Atmospheric Transport Pathways, Vulnerability, and Possible Ac-
cidental Consequences from the Nuclear Risk Sites in the European Arctic” (AR-NARP,20
2001–2003) is an extension and integration of previous studies in this field, and hence,
the methodology (Baklanov and Mahura, 2001; Mahura and Baklanov, 2002; Baklanov
et al., 2002b), which is elaborating in bounds of this project, is a logical continuation of
our mentioned work.
2. Methodology25
As it was mentioned, each of the two approaches – the probabilistic risk assessment
and the case studies assessment – has some possibilities and shortcomings. Neither
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one of them is sufficient for the complex risk assessments. Therefore, as optimal,
the following strategy for multidisciplinary methodology integrating different specific
approaches is suggested:
– PRA approach for probabilistic atmospheric studies;5
– combination of the PRA and CSA approaches;
– radio-ecological sensitivity and specific nutrition pathways for studied regions;
– probabilistic safety assessments and probabilities of different severity accidents;
– possible social and economical loss and consequences;
– GIS-integration of different factors, probabilities, and indicators for risk and vulnera-10
bility mapping.
2.1. General scheme for probabilistic risk assessment
General scheme for the suggested methodology of the probabilistic risk assessments
based on the long-term modelling is shown in Fig. 1. For assessment the following
items should be considered:15
1) social-geophysical factors:
– accident severity and release characteristics;
– proximity to risk sites and level of plume dispersion;
– population density in area;
– presence of critical groups of population;20
– radio-ecological vulnerability of area;
– risk perception, preparedness of safety measures, emergency preparedness sys-
tems;
– economical and technical means, counteracting consequences of accident;
2) probabilities:25
– probability of an accident of certain severity at the sites;
– probability of atmospheric transport from the sites towards regions of interest;
– probability of radionuclide removal over regions during atmospheric transport from
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the sites.
The following approaches and modelling tools are used in the suggested methodol-
ogy for PRA studies:
– Trajectory modelling (e.g. 3-D isentropic trajectory model, Merrill et al., 1985, and 3-D
DMI trajectory model, Sørensen et al., 1994) to calculate multiyear forward trajectories5
originated over the NRS regions at various altitudes;
– Cluster analysis (Mahura, 1998; Mahura et al., 1999; Baklanov et al., 2002a) to iden-
tify atmospheric transport pathways from NRSs;
– Probability fields analysis (Mahura, 2001; Baklanov et al., 2002a) to construct
monthly, seasonal, and annual probability fields for airflow, fast transport, precipita-10
tion factor, and other indicators to identify the most impacted geographical regions;
– Long-range transport modelling (e.g. DERMA, Sørensen, 1998; Baklanov and
Sørensen, 2001, and DMI-HIRLAM, Sass et al., 2000, models) to simulate radionu-
clide transport and deposition for hypothetical accidental releases at NRSs, and to
compare with results of trajectory modelling;15
– Specific case studies (Bergman et al., 1998; Baklanov et al., 2001, 2002a) to esti-
mate consequences for environment and population after hypothetical accidents using
experimental models based on the Chernobyl effects for the Nordic countries (Moberg,
1991; Dahlgaard, 1994; Nielsen, 1998);
– Radioecological vulnerability to radioactive deposition (Bergman and A˚gren, 1999;20
O¨CB, 2000) to evaluate vulnerability concerning its persistence in the ecosystems with
focus on transfer of certain radionuclides into food chains of key importance for the
intake and exposure in a whole population and certain groups;
– Risk evaluation and mapping (Rigina, 2001; Rigina and Baklanov, 2002) to analyze
socio-economical consequences for different geographical areas and various popula-25
tion groups taking into account social-geophysical factors and probabilities and using
geographic, demographic, administrative and economical databases in combination
with the GIS-analysis.
The main focus of this paper is to describe the aspects of the suggested methodology
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for the probabilistic atmospheric studies based on the trajectory modelling approach
for further risk and vulnerability analysis, namely the four upper blocks of Fig. 1. Here
we do not consider aspects of the probabilistic dispersion and deposition modelling,
which is a topic of a separate paper. Regarding to the firth block shown in Fig. 1, the
used GIS methods are discussed by Rigina (2001), Rigina and Baklanov (2002). It5
is devoted to problems of residential radiation risk and territorial vulnerability mapping
with respect to NRSs. Their study suggested two methods, based on an integration
of the mathematical modelling and GIS-based spatial analyses which allow merging
together the separate aspects: probabilistic analysis, dose estimation, modelling of
consequences, etc.10
2.2. Trajectory modelling approach
In general, each computed atmospheric trajectory represents a pathway of an air par-
cel motion in time and space. There are a few approaches to model atmospheric tra-
jectories. Two of these approaches are commonly used: isobaric and isentropic. The
modelling of more realistic trajectories – “fully 3-D trajectories” – is preferable, although15
it is complex and it requires incorporation into simulation of large number of variables
and parameters, and moreover, for the long-term statistics it increases significantly a
computational time. In this study the isentropic approach was selected. Although this
type of trajectory modelling uses assumption of adiabatically moving air parcels and
neglects various physical effects, it is still a useful research tool for evaluating common20
airflow patterns within meteorological systems on various scales. Some uncertainties
in these models are related to the interpolation of meteorological data, which might
be sparsely measured, applicability of the considered horizontal and vertical scales,
assumptions of vertical transport, etc. (Merrill et al., 1985; Kahl, 1996; Stohl, 1998).
As input data, a gridded dataset – NCEP Global Tropospheric Analyses – available25
at the NCAR archives was used. The original gridded wind fields were interpolated to
potential temperature (isentropic) surfaces. It should be noted that quality of trajectory
calculation is highly dependent on the original quality of the NCEP fields (2.5◦ × 2.5◦
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latitude vs. longitude), and it may not reflect the contribution of the frontal passages
and local terrain phenomena. However, the trajectory errors rising during a single cal-
culation might be smoothed in further analysis due to the large number of trajectories
in the multiyear dataset. Among the higher-resolution meteorological data, the DMI-
HIRLAM (Sass et al., 2000) and ECMWF archives which were used in 3-D trajectory5
model (Sørensen et al., 1994) should be mentioned.
An interpolation procedure was performed for a multiyear period applying a tech-
nique described by Merrill et al. (1985). Then, interpolated wind fields were used to
compute forward trajectories from the site regions at standard UTC terms at different
potential temperature levels. These levels ranged from 255◦ K to 330◦ K with a step of10
5◦ K. In general, less than two percent of trajectories were missing because of absence
of archived meteorological data.
Instead of calculating only one trajectory, four trajectories for every calculation were
used. The initial points of trajectories are located at each corner of a 1◦ × 1◦ of latitude
vs. longitude box, where the site is in the centre of the box. Calculation of four trajec-15
tories simultaneously allowed evaluating a consistency of the wind field in the direction
of the atmospheric transport. Although all calculated trajectories were used for further
analysis, it should be noted that there are differences in the representation of the gen-
eral flow along trajectories. The flow is considered to be a reasonably consistent along
the transport pathway if all four trajectories had shown a similar direction (reflecting20
convergence of flow) of transport for one time period. Trajectories, showing a strong
divergence of flow, are assigned to a category of the “complex trajectories”. These
trajectories reflect more uncertainties in the air parcel motion. These differences are
not so important in evaluation of the general climatological patterns, but they can be
significant in, for example, identification of source regions for air pollutants, evaluation25
of the nature of the specific events with recorded elevated concentration of species,
tracking tracers in the atmosphere, etc.
For all NRSs, the most probable release heights would be within the boundary layer,
i.e. within several hundred meters above the ground. Therefore, at the next step, from
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all trajectories only those trajectories originating within this layer were selected. The
chosen trajectories for further statistical analysis are limited by duration of 5 days. This
limitation was decided to use because of 1) quality and accuracy of trajectory calcula-
tions after 5 days drops significantly, 2) observing development frames of the synoptic
scales systems in the Euro-Arctic region, as well as 3) relative proximity of the analyzed5
geographical regions from the sites of interest. Moreover, to study altitudinal variations
in the flow patterns (in particular, within the boundary layer and free troposphere), tra-
jectories originated over the site regions at altitudes of 1.5 and 3 km above sea level
(asl) could be also considered.
2.3. Statistical analysis approach10
2.3.1. Cluster analysis for atmospheric transport pathways
The cluster analysis is a variety of multivariate statistical analysis techniques, which
could be used to explore the existing structure within data sets. The specific purpose
of this analysis is to divide a data set into groups (or clusters) of similar variables (or
cases). Miller (1981) initiated application of the cluster analysis on trajectories. The15
important output of his study was evaluation of the airflow climatology, in particular,
over the long time periods. Then later, cluster analysis techniques on trajectories were
used extensively by various researchers in different scientific fields.
In general, output of cluster analysis on trajectories can provide insights in the tracers
transport, common atmospheric flow patterns for the sites of interest, identification of20
the source regions for atmospheric pollutants, etc. The cluster analysis is used to
divide calculated trajectories into groups, which represent the major airflow transport
regimes. The following criteria are used: latitude and longitude values at each time
interval of trajectory. These represent both direction and velocity of air parcel motion.
Similarity among trajectories in each cluster is maximized considering the full length25
of each forward trajectory. Within each cluster, individual trajectories can be averaged
to obtain the mean cluster trajectory (or atmospheric transport pathway). Thus, the
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original large data set of trajectories can be reduced to a small number of mean cluster
plots. These plots then can be interpreted, based on common synoptic conditions and
features, and hence, the airflow climatology for the site can be summarized.
2.3.2. Probability fields analysis for probabilistic impact indicators
Probabilistic analysis is one of the ways to estimate the likelihood of occurrence of one5
or more phenomena or events. For each site a large number of forward trajectories that
passed over various geographical regions was calculated. Each calculated trajectory
contains information about longitude, latitude, altitude, pressure, temperature, relative
humidity, etc. at each modelling time interval (in this study – 12 h). The probability fields
for these mentioned characteristics, either individual or combined, can be represented10
by a superposition of probabilities for air parcels reaching each grid area in the chosen
domain or on a geographical map.
Let us consider several common approaches to construct probability fields based
on trajectory modelling results (Baklanov and Mahura, 2001; Mahura, 2001; Mahura
and Baklanov, 2002). For all approaches, initially, a gridded domain having Mlat ×Mlon15
latitude vs. longitude grid points with a size of ∆Y × ∆X degrees latitude vs. longitude
should be constructed. The selection of sizes ∆Y and ∆X depends on the resolution
of original meteorological fields used for calculation of trajectories. The number of
latitudinal and longitudinal grid points – Mlat and Mlon – is selected taking into account
the farthest geographical boundaries which might be reached by air masses during the20
period studied. Time t is the output modelling time interval which is equal 12 h for our
study. The first approach to construct such fields considers the number of trajectory
intersections with each cell of the gridded domain (NCELLij):
where:
Yk,t, , Yk,t – longitude and latitude of k-trajectory at time t;25
Xi , Xi+1 – longitudinal boundaries of the grid cells of the gridded domain;
Yj , Yj+1 – latitudinal boundaries of the grid cells of the gridded domain;
Ntr – total number of trajectories during the period studied (number of days considered
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* 8 trajectories per day);
Mlat, Mlon – number of the grid points in domain along latitude and longitude.
The second approach for construction of probabilistic fields uses an assumption that
the total sum of contributions from all individual grid cells of domain is equal to 100%.
Hence, the contribution or probability that a given trajectory might reach the geograph-5
ical boundaries of the individual cell could be estimated as follows:
Pi ,j =
NCELLij
Ntot
· 100%
Ntot =
Mlat∑
i=1
Mlon∑
j=1
MCELLi,j,
where:
Pi ,j – probability of trajectory intersections with a particular cell of the gridded domain;10
Ntot – total number of trajectory intersections with all cells of the gridded domain.
The third approach for construction of probabilistic fields uses an assumption that for
an individual site there is always a region where there is the highest probability of the
maximum possible impact due to atmospheric transport. The detailed description of
this approach is given in Sect. 2.4.1. In our study, the third approach to construct the15
probabilistic fields was selected as the most representative to evaluate the site possible
impact compared with the previous two.
It should be noted that the most interest for further analysis would be the following
indicators, based on the probabilistic fields: 1) airflow and fast transport, 2) maximum
possible impact zone and maximum reaching distance, 3) typical transport time, and20
4) precipitation factor.
5300
ACPD
3, 5289–5317, 2003
Assessment of
possible airborne
impact from nuclear
risk sites – Part I
A. A. Baklanov and
A. G. Mahura
Title Page
Abstract Introduction
Conclusions References
Tables Figures
J I
J I
Back Close
Full Screen / Esc
Print Version
Interactive Discussion
© EGU 2003
2.4. Indicators of the nuclear risk site possible impact
2.4.1. Airflow and fast transport probability fields
The first type of probabilistic fields (airflow probability fields) shows the common fea-
tures in the atmospheric transport patterns, i.e. it may provide a general insight on the
possible main direction of the radioactive cloud transport as well as the probability that5
it will reach or pass any geographical area (Fig. 2). The result of this analysis is an ap-
propriate test to support or disprove results of the cluster analysis. This is because the
atmospheric transport pathways (or mean trajectory clusters) show only the common
direction of airflow away from the site. However, information between these pathways
(or clusters) is missing.10
The second type of probabilistic fields (fast transport probability fields) indicates the
probability of the air parcels movement during the first day of transport (Fig. 3). It is
important information, especially, for estimating the short-living radionuclides - such as
iodine isotopes – impact. These fast transport fields show those territories that may
be reached after the first day, and those areas that are at the most danger due to fast15
transport probability.
These two types of probability fields are constructed using the third approach (see
Sect. 2.3.2) based on assumption that for an individual site there is always a region
where possible impact due to atmospheric transport might be the highest. The bor-
ders of such region (or more precisely, the cells included in such region) could be20
estimated by comparing the number of trajectory intersections with the cells (adjacent
to the site location) with the cell where the maximum number of intersections occurred:
NAMC = max
(
NCELL1,1, ..., NCELLMlat,Mlon
)
. Among all grid cells, the cell where the abso-
lute maximum of intersections occurred would be identified as an “absolute maximum
cell” (AMC). Because all trajectories start near the site region, to account for the con-25
tribution into the flow at larger distances from the site, the area of maximum to cells
adjacent to the AMC was extended. The number of intersections in cells adjacent to
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AMC was compared, and then assigned additional cells, which had difference of less
than 10% between cells. Therefore, this new “area of maxima”, if isolines are drawn,
will represent the area of the highest probability of the possible impact (AHPPI) from
the site. Assuming a value of 100% for this area, the rest could be re-calculated as
percentage of the area at the highest probability of the possible impact, or:5
PAHPMIi,j =
NCELLij
ND
· 100%,
ND = Ntot −NAHPMI,
NAHPMI =
Mlat∑
i=1
Mlon∑
j=1
ni j ,
ni j =
{
0
NCELLi,j
if NCELLi,j ≥ 0.9 · NAMC,
where:10
PAHPMIi,j – probability of the NRS impact with respect to the area of the highest proba-
bility of the possible impact (AHPPI) of the nuclear risk site;
ND – total sum of trajectory intersections with cells from the gridded domain, except
the cells located in the boundaries of AHPPI for the nuclear risk site;
NAHPMI – total sum of trajectory intersections with cells from the gridded domain located15
within the boundaries of AHPPI for the nuclear risk site.
The isolines (Fig. 2) start from “10” (%) and show contribution of cells into the total
redistribution of the airflow around the site with respect to AHPPI. The boundaries of
AHPPI (extended more in east-south sector from the site) are outlined by the isoline
of “> 90” (%). This field also shows dominance of the westerly flows from the NRS20
region.
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2.4.2. Maximum possible impact zone and maximum reaching distance
The third type of probabilistic fields, first, indicates boundaries of regions with the high-
est probability of being reached by trajectories during the first day of atmospheric trans-
port from the risk sites. Let’s call this indicator the maximum possible impact zone
(MPIZ). Second, this type of the field also indicates the farthest boundaries on the ge-5
ographical map that might be reached during the first day by, at least, one trajectory
originating over the NRS location. Let’s call it the maximum reaching distance (MRD).
To visualize the MPIZ indicator, all endpoints of calculated trajectories originated
within the boundary layer were also counted (such calculation can be done for any
other layer or altitude) during the first day of transport (at 12 and 24h). Then, a similar10
approach for construction of probability fields (as was used for the airflow and fast
transport probability fields; see Sect. 2.4.1) was used to construct the MPIZ field. An
isoline of MPIZ was drawn through the areas with the highest occurrence of trajectory
intersections with the cells of the gridded domain (Fig. 4).
To visualize the MRD indicator, all endpoints of calculated trajectories at the end of15
the first day of atmospheric transport were used. An isoline of MRD was drawn through
the grid cells where, at least, one trajectory intersected with the grid cell boundaries
(Fig. 4). It should be noted also, that although the likelihood that an air parcel will reach
these boundaries is low, it is still a possible case of atmospheric transport from the site.
2.4.3. Typical transport time fields20
In the emergency response systems for nuclear accidents, the estimation of the ra-
dionuclide transport time to a particular territory, region, county, city, etc. is one of
the important input parameters in the decision-making process. This information is
extracted from the calculated isentropic trajectories and constructed the fourth type of
probabilistic fields called the typical transport time (TTT) fields. These fields show: first,25
how long, typically, it will take for an air parcel to reach a particular geographical region
from the NRS location, and second, what territories would be at the highest risk during
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the first few days of radionuclide cloud transport after an accident at NRS.
To construct the TTT fields, at the first step, a new polar grid domain having 36
sectors (10◦ each) and 35 grid cells (2◦ each) along each sector line with the risk site in
the center was built (although any other detalization of a grid domain could be chosen).
At the second step, in the same way as in the probability fields analysis, the number of5
trajectory intersections was counted in each grid cell of new domain. Then, along each
sector a grid cell with absolute maximum of trajectory intersections was selected, and
an isoline of typical transport time was constructed.
A similar procedure is repeated for each selected temporal term. As a step of this
procedure, initially, the geographical coordinates (latitude and longitude) were con-10
verted into polar coordinates (radius R(Xt, Yt) and polar angle α(Xt, Ut)):
R(Xt, Yt) =
√
(Xt − XNRS)2 + (Yt − YNRS)2,
γ(Xt, Yt) = arctan
(
(Y1 − YNRS)
(Xt − XNRS)
)
,
α(Xt, Yt) =

90 − γ(Xt, Yt) if N − E
90 + γ(Xt, Yt) if E − S
180 + γ(Xt, Yt) if S −W
270 + γ(Xt, Yt) if W −N
,
where: Xt, Yt – longitude and latitude of trajectory at time t,15
XNRS, YNRS – longitude and latitude of the NRS location,
γ(Xt, Yt) – angle calculated for one of quadrants.
Then, for each time t in each cell of the sector, a number of trajectory intersections
NCELLij(t) was counted, and compared with the cells along the sector line to find a cell
with the absolute maximum of trajectory intersections NAMC(t):20
NCELLij(t) =
Msec t∑
j=1
Mint∑
i=1
ni j ,
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ni j =
{
0
1
if
{
Rgridi,j ≤ R(Xt, Yt) < Rgridi+1,j+1
αgridi,j ≤ α(Xt, Yt) < αgridi+1,j+1
,
NAMC(t) = max
[
NCELL1,1(t), ..., NCELLMsec t ,Mint (t)
]
,
where:
Rgrod, αgrid – radius and angle of grid points in the gridded domain;
Msec t, Mint – total number of grid points of the gridded domain (36 sectors ×10◦ and5
35 + 1 + 35 = 71 intervals ×2◦, respectively).
For simplicity, if several AMC cells were identified along the sector line then the
closest to the site was selected for construction of the TTT field (example of one- and
two-day TTT is shown for the Leningrad NPP in Fig. 5). It should be noted that the TTT
fields’ construction for the terms later than 2.5-3 days is complicated due to significant10
airflow propagation from the site locations, and hence, the later terms isolines are not
concentrated around the site and less representative.
2.4.4. Removal or precipitation factor
The wet deposition is an issue of most concern during atmospheric transport of ra-
dionuclide cloud over the geographical territories. It is highly temporally and spatially15
dependent. It plays important role in the estimation of the radionuclide surface deposi-
tion. To analyze the possible contribution of the removal processes during atmospheric
transport from the NRS locations we might apply at least three different approaches.
The first approach is based on the evaluation of the precipitation climatology for the
particular geographical area. Such climatological maps (on a multiyear and seasonal20
basis for the large scale domains) might be obtained from the meteorological weather
services. These maps would reflect the accumulated precipitation measured near the
surface for each interval of time. It may be used for identification of the large size
areas having common precipitation patterns. In particular, on such maps these areas
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are connected with the major centers of synoptic activity. However, air parcels might
travel within different atmospheric layers during their transport from the NRS region.
For example, if an air parcel travels in the free troposphere and there is no precipitation
in this layer, but the area is marked as precipitable at the climatological map that will
raise a misleading concern.5
Therefore, the second approach is based on the evaluation of the probabilistic fields
for the “precipitation factor” (O¨CB, 2000; INTAS, 2000; Mahura et al., 2001). Relative
humidity “plays a role” of the precipitation factor. At each selected time interval for each
forward trajectory additional parameters including relative humidity can be calculated.
It is one of the factors, which will determine the possibility of radionuclide removal dur-10
ing transport. Increasing relative humidity in the atmosphere is one of the signals of the
water vapor increasing presence, and it may, in the presence of the cloud condensation
nuclear, lead to formation of cloud cover. After clouds develop and form, under certain
conditions there is a possibility of precipitation, and hence, radionuclide removal. Con-
struction of the relative humidity fields is similar to the first steps in the probability field15
analysis. In this case, an average value of the relative humidity in each grid cell was
calculated. Both the precipitation and relative humidity fields have a cellular figure in
comparison with the airflow pattern. A pitfall in this analysis is the fact that all relative
humidity values are directly related to the existing flow pattern. So, each field is valid
only with respect to a particular risk site. Nevertheless, it is a more realistic pattern of20
the possible removal during transport than calculating rainfall climatological maps used
in the first approach, because it includes processes above the surface. The limitation
always is how we might resolve precipitation processes during air parcels transport. To
resolve them we would need a finer meteorological data resolution.
The third approach is based on the direct evaluation of the wet deposition fields at25
the ground surface (Baklanov et al., 2002b). It is also required to have multiyear output
fields for comparison. For these purposes, we might run a dispersion and deposition
model for a long-term period. Although this way is more accurate, it is more expensive
computationally.
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3. Conclusions
The methodology for assessment of nuclear risk and vulnerability for population in dif-
ferent geographical regions and countries in case of a severe accident at nuclear risk
sites (NRSs) was outlined and discussed. The social-geophysical factors and indica-
tors of the NRS possible impact which depend on the location of the area of interest5
and its population, were considered.
The evaluation of atmospheric transport is given from the probabilistic point of view.
The main questions stated were: What are probabilities and times for radionuclide at-
mospheric transport to different neighbouring countries and territories in case of the
hypothetical accidental release at the nuclear risk site? Which geographical territo-10
ries or countries are at the highest risk from the hypothetical accidental releases? To
answer these questions, in bounds of the probabilistic atmospheric studies several re-
search tools were recommended to apply: (i) long-term trajectory modelling, (ii) a set
of statistical methods to analyze trajectory modelling results, and (iii) constructing and
mapping probabilistic fields of different NRS possible impact indicators due to atmo-15
spheric transport.
Several useful indicators and methods of their construction were suggested and
given. The indicators, based on results of trajectory modelling, are the following:
– Atmospheric transport pathways,
– Airflow probability fields,20
– Fast transport probability fields,
– Typical transport time fields,
– Maximum reaching distance,
– Maximum possible impact zone,
– Removal or precipitation factor.25
It is assumed that these indicators will be applicable for further GIS-based analysis
with integration of mathematical modelling to estimate risk and vulnerability as well as
for the planning of emergency response and preparedness systems in cases of acci-
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dental releases at NRSs. The applicability of the methodology includes also:
– Initial preliminary estimates of the atmospheric transport probability in event of an
accidental release at NRS;
– Improvement of systems for monitoring and emergency response to accidental re-
leases;5
– Input for the social and economical studies of consequences due to the NRS impact
on population and environment of the neighbouring territories and countries;
– Input for the multidisciplinary risk and vulnerability analyses, probabilistic assessment
of radionuclide local-, regional-, and long-range transport;
– Modelling and testing of the higher resolution models.10
The second part of this paper (Mahura and Baklanov, 2003) shows a testing of the
developed methodology on examples of NRSs situated in the Euro-Arctic region.
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Fig. 1. Proposed scheme of the probabilistic risk assessment for atmospheric studies.
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Fig. 2. Annual airflow probability field from the Leningrad nuclear power plant.
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Fig. 3. Annual fast transport probability field after 24 h of atmospheric transport from the
Leningrad nuclear power plant.
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Fig. 4. Annual boundaries of the maximum reaching distance (–LNP MRD–) and maximum
possible impact zone (–LNP MPIZ–) indicators for the Leningrad nuclear power plant.
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Fig. 5. Annual typical transport time fields at 1 (–1d–) and 2 (–2d–) days of atmospheric
transport from the Leningrad nuclear power plant.
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